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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the incentive effects of automobile insurance, compulsory insurance laws,
and no-fault liability laws on driver behavior and traffic fatalities. We analyze a panel of 50 U.S.
states and the District of Columbia from 1970-1998, a period in which many states adopted
compulsory insurance regulations and/or no-fault laws. Using an instrumental variables approach,
we find evidence that automobile insurance has moral hazard costs, leading to an increase in traffic
fatalities. We also find that reductions in accident liability produced by no-fault liability laws have
led to an increase in traffic fatalities (estimated to be on the order of 6%). Overall, our results
indicate that, whatever other benefits they might produce, increases in the incidence of automobile
insurance and moves to no-fault liability systems have significant negative effects on traffic
fatalities.
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alcohen@nber.org and NBER
rd247@columbia.eduIn the United States today, we are at the threshold of a great 
experiment in social insurance – one of the most far-reaching in 
consequence of any that has been yet attempted in the New 
World. Probably within the next decade or two, most of the 
states will pass laws, the purposes of which will be the financial 
assistance of some or all of the victims of automobile accidents, 
and the prevention of such accidents in so far as is possible. 
 
--Edison L. Bowers, Selected Articles on Compulsory 
Automobile Insurance. New York: The W.H. Wilson Company, 
1929. 
 
1      Introduction 
  This paper examines how economic incentives and liability regulation influence driver 
behavior and, in turn, traffic fatalities. We use the introduction of compulsory insurance and 
no-fault liability regulation to examine the moral hazard effects of automobile insurance, 
compulsory insurance laws, and no-fault liability laws. We analyze a panel of 50 U.S. states 
and the District of Columbia from 1970-1998, a period in which many states adopted 
compulsory insurance regulations and/or no-fault laws. Using compulsory insurance as an 
instrument for the proportion of uninsured motorists, we find that automobile insurance has 
significant moral hazard costs, namely reducing precautions and increasing traffic fatalities. 
We also find that limiting motor vehicle liability through no-fault liability laws leads to an 
increase in traffic fatalities. Overall our results indicate that, whatever benefits flow from 
increasing the incidence of automobile insurance and from moves to a no-fault system, there 
are also significant moral hazard costs to doing so.  
Traffic accidents have very large costs which merit substantial attention by 
economists (see, e.g., Edlin (1999), Levitt and Porter (2001)). These accidents claim over 
40,000 lives each year in the United States, roughly the same as the number of Americans 
killed during the Vietnam War. Americans spend roughly $100 billion each year on 
automobile insurance premia, and they bear over $250 billion in uninsured accident costs 
each year. The incidence of motor vehicle crashes and traffic fatalities is likely to be 
influenced significantly by choices made by drivers (including whether to use seat belts or air 
bags, how carefully to drive, whether to drink alcohol, and how much to drive). Accordingly, 
economists have long been interested in how these choices are influenced by agents’  
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economic incentives and by various legal rules and policy measures (see, e.g., the seminal 
work of Peltzman (1975a,b)).  
Beginning in 1970, most U.S. states adopted compulsory automobile insurance 
requirements. Over the same period, 16 states adopted no-fault automobile insurance. The 
impact of these policy shifts on traffic fatalities is of interest for two reasons. First, 
identifying this effect – which we shall see is significant – is necessary for assessing the 
social desirability of these policies. Second, these changes in automobile insurance 
regulations provide a large-scale natural experiment through which we can examine the 
moral hazard effects of automobile insurance and the incentive effects of liability exposure. 
In this sense, the changes in laws that we examine offer an interesting window on a larger set 
of phenomena. 
Specifically, we investigate two related issues. First, we examine whether having 
automobile insurance has a moral-hazard effect on traffic fatalities; empirically, we examine 
the proportion of uninsured motorists. As a theoretical matter, insurance does have the moral 
hazard cost of reducing the policyholder’s incentives to take precautions against the insured 
loss.
1 This is also theoretically the case for the particular type of insurance that we examine, 
namely insurance for automobile accidents (see Shavell (1982, 1987, and 2000)). However, 
the question is whether the reduction in precautions against automobile accidents produced 
by automobile insurance – which theory predicts – is empirically significant. For example, it 
might be that drivers’ concern for their own safety and health provide sufficient incentives 
for them to take precautions (to the extent that taking precautions is affected at all by 
incentives) and that the presence of insurance makes little difference on the margin. 
Although there has been much interest in the incidence of automobile insurance and 
uninsured motorists,
2 whether automobile insurance leads to moral hazard costs is an open 
question that has not been addressed by existing research.  
                                                 
1 Classic references analyzing this effect include Pauly (1968), Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Shavell (1979). 
For a comprehensive recent survey of models investigating the moral hazard costs of insurance, see Winter (2000). 
2 Edlin (1999) documents the congestion externalities of driving, but these are distinct from the moral hazard costs 
of insurance.  
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Our strategy for examining this issue is to look at the consequences of a natural 
experiment: the adoption of compulsory insurance regulations in some states governed by 
tort law. Because this change produces a reduction in uninsured motorists not attributable to 
other confounding factors, we are able to test the consequences of a reduction in uninsured 
motorists on traffic fatalities. Although some work on compulsory insurance has been done 
(see Ma and Schmidt (2000) and Cole, Dumm, and McCullough (2001)), none of these 
papers make the connection between such regulations and traffic fatalities. Derrig et al. 
(2001), who do connect the two, find insignificant effects on fatalities rates. Our results 
indicate that a reduction in the incidence of uninsured motorists produces an increase in 
traffic fatalities.  
The second issue we examine is the effect on traffic fatalities of the reduction in 
liability brought about by no-fault laws. Earlier work by Landes (1982) suggested that, by 
reducing incentives to drive carefully, such laws have led to an increase in traffic fatalities in 
the United States. Subsequently, Zador and Lund (1986) re-ran Landes’s regressions using a 
longer data set and found the opposite effect; Kochanowski and Young (1985) and Derrig et 
al (2001) found no significant effect; and Cummins, Phillips, and Weiss (2001) recently 
found a significant positive effect of no-fault on traffic fatalities.
3 However, all states that 
adopted no-fault limitations on liability also adopted compulsory insurance requirements at 
the same time, and these earlier studies did not attempt to separate the effects of the two 
elements of the legislation. Thus, they did not isolate the effect of limitations on liability as 
distinct from the effects of the accompanying adoption of compulsory insurance 
requirements. We consider the two elements of legislation simultaneously, and in this way 
are able to identify the effect of no-fault limitations on liability separately from the effect of 
compulsory insurance requirements. We find that no-fault limitations on liability do increase 
fatalities. Specifically, we estimate that the effect of such limitations is to increase fatalities 
by about 6%.  
This paper is also related to, and seeks to contribute to, the broader literature on the 
factors and policy measures that influence traffic fatalities. There is an extensive literature on  
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how the use of seat belts directly reduces fatalities and on whether it indirectly increases 
fatalities by encouraging users to drive less carefully (see, e.g., Peltzman (1975a), Levitt and 
Porter (1999), Cohen and Einav (2001)). There is also work on how traffic fatalities are 
influenced by the consumption of alcohol, and in turn by some measures discouraging the 
sale of alcohol (see, e.g., Levitt and Porter (2001), Sloan, Reilly, and Schenzler (1994)). 
White (1989) investigates how comparative and contributory negligence rules affect the 
levels of care used by drivers (as judged by jury determination in accident cases). Vickery  
(1968), Edlin (1999) and Edlin and Mandic (1999) examine the effects of miles driven on 
fatalities and how they could be influenced by appropriately designed taxes or insurance 
premia. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary background by 
discussing the laws regarding compulsory insurance and no-fault liability. Section 3 lays out 
theoretical predictions and our approach to testing them. Section 4 describes the data. Section 
5 presents our results. Section 6 makes concluding remarks. 
 
2      Automobile Insurance and Liability for Accidents  
We start with some background on automobile insurance and liability. There is a wide range 
of regulation governing automobile insurance and liability. In this paper, we focus on two 
aspects of regulation that directly affect drivers: compulsory insurance and no-fault systems. 
 
2.1 Compulsory Insurance Regulation  
Each year a large amount of insurance coverage for automobile accidents is purchased in the 
US. Total automobile liability insurance premia are over $100 billion annually. A significant 
amount of insurance would be bought without any regulation, simply because drivers are 
risk-averse. However, current purchases might be influenced by the existence of compulsory 
insurance regulations. 
  Compulsory automobile insurance means that all those operating a motor vehicle 
must purchase insurance. Given the bounded nature of assets that individuals commonly 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 In studies on other countries, Devlin (1992) and McEwin (1989) found that no-fault liability laws increased 
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have, it is often rational for them to elect not to purchase insurance if they are free to do so 
(e.g., Huberman, Mayers and Smith (1993)). Compulsory insurance laws ensure some 
compensation to those injured in automobile accidents (see Stone (1926) for an early work 
advocating compulsory insurance laws on this basis). When drivers have limited assets, such 
laws also force drivers to at least partly internalize some of the externality imposed on others 
by their driving (Shavell (1987), Keeton and Kwerel (1984)). 
Compulsory insurance regulation was first introduced in Massachusetts in 1927. It 
had been adopted by 22 states by 1975, and by 45 states by 1997, the end of the sample 
period (see Table 2). Among these states, there is variation in the amount of each type of 
insurance that individuals are required to purchase and in the methods used to enforce this 
regulation. We observe two aspects of enforcement: 40 states require that a driver’s 
insurance status be reported at the time of an accident, and 35 states require that insurance 
companies notify the appropriate state authorities if a driver’s insurance policy lapses.  
 
2.2 Accident Liability Systems: Tort vs. No-Fault  
Historically the liability of drivers for accident losses was governed by tort principles. 
Drivers were liable for losses to others that resulted from their negligent behavior. In theory, 
a tort system with a negligence rule that functions perfectly – i.e., in which courts can always 
costlessly and accurately determine whether behavior was negligent – provides optimal 
incentives for care in driving and accident prevention. However, in practice, the tort system 
has various flaws, such as the substantial administrative costs and delays involved in 
adjudicating negligence and thus liability.  
Perceived problems with the tort system have led reformers to propose no-fault 
liability systems. As early as 1926, there was analysis of the idea that there are potential 
benefits from limiting negligence-based suits and offering protection against injuries in 
automobile insurance regardless of fault (see Sherman (1926)). In 1932, the Columbia 
University Counsel for Research in Social Sciences proposed a scheme in which each motor 
vehicle owner would be required to carry a policy covering him against liability arising from 
                                                                                                                                                             
fatalities in Quebec and in Australia and New Zealand respectively.  
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injury, economic loss, or death, regardless of fault.  In 1965, Keeton and O’Connell (1965) 
published an influential study calling for a move to a no-fault system.  
The first jurisdiction to adopt such a scheme was Saskatchewan (in Canada) in 1946. 
In the US, the first state to adopt a no-fault system was Massachusetts in 1971. By 1975, 16 
states had adopted a no-fault system. Most of these states (with the exception of 
Massachusetts and New York) adopted compulsory insurance concurrently with no-fault 
limitations on liability. The number of states with a no-fault system fell to 14 in 1997, with 6 
states switching status in between. 
There are two important elements of a no-fault system. First, (most) no-fault systems 
require drivers to purchase insurance that provides first-party coverage for accident losses, 
regardless of who was at fault.  Second, no-fault systems limit the extent to which drivers can 
be sued through negligence-based suits. In a pure no-fault system, victims do not have any 
recourse to negligence-based suits. However, all states provide for thresholds beyond which 
the parties to an accident have recourse to lawsuits. As outlined in Table 2, in 13 states 
(Arizona, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) 
no-fault exists in parallel with the traditional tort system. In these so-called add-on states, 
there are no limitations to litigation. The remaining states provide either a monetary or verbal 
(i.e., descriptive) threshold beyond which individuals have the right to sue. 
  Add-on regulations are a combination of the no-fault and tort systems, adding no-fault 
protection to the tort system without imposing any limitations on the latter. Ten states 
adopted add-on regulations. Because of its hybrid nature, it is difficult to predict the effects 
of add-on regulation. Hence, we focus on no-fault, but will examine the effect of the 
threshold below which tort limitations are imposed.   
 
3      Theoretical Predictions and Testing Approach 
We begin by discussing the effect of compulsory insurance laws on uninsured motorists and 
fatalities, both theoretically and empirically. Next, we discuss the effect of no-fault laws on 
fatalities and uninsured motorists, and the issues that arise in identifying the effect of no-fault 
laws as distinct from compulsory insurance laws. Finally, we discuss the direct effect of  
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uninsured motorists on traffic fatalities and the instrumental variables identification of this 
effect.  
 
3.1 The Effect of Compulsory Insurance Regulations 
The effects of compulsory insurance regulation on drivers will vary depending on what 
insurance choice they would have made in the absence of compulsory insurance. Figure 1 
identifies four groups of individuals. 
 
Figure 1: Insurance Status before and after Compulsory Insurance 
  Status with compulsory insurance 
  Insured Uninsured 
Insured 
 






(Uninsured, Insured)  (Uninsured, 
Uninsured) 
 
The individuals in the (1,1) cell would have purchased insurance in the absence of 
regulation, and continue to do so when it is compulsory. For these “always-insurers”, the 
regulation has no direct effect, since their insurance status does not change (we adapt the 
terminology of Imbens and Angrist (1992)).
4  
Drivers in the (2,1) cell are induced to adopt insurance because of compulsory 
insurance regulation. This is the group for whom the instrumental variables method identifies 
the effect of insurance on fatalities. These individuals did not deem insurance to be 
worthwhile or necessary in the absence of regulation, but they obtain it when it is 
compulsory. These drivers are forced to pay the premium, but accordingly are faced with 
                                                 
4 It can, however, have indirect effects, through the price of insurance and through the insurance status of other 
drivers. However these indirect effects are either negligible or second-order. This would influence individual’s 
decisions regarding how much insurance to purchase. Another indirect effect would be with respect to liability from, 
or to, other drivers involved in an accident. If drivers are insured, in principle they are covered regardless of the 
insurance status of the other driver. Of course the insurance company is affected, and this may have an indirect 
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diminished liability in case of an accident. Because of the classic moral-hazard problem (see 
Shavell (1979, 1982)), these individuals typically will drive less carefully when insured.
5  
Individuals in the (2,2) cell would not have purchased insurance in the absence of 
regulation, and do not purchase it even when it is compulsory. The driving behavior of these 
individuals is affected to the extent that compulsory insurance laws succeed in inducing 
some individuals to switch from being uninsured to being insured. To the extent that 
compulsory insurance laws are effective, those drivers who remain uninsured are induced to 
drive more carefully, since their status as uninsured drivers is illegal under compulsory 
insurance laws. If, however, compulsory insurance laws were ineffective and did not induce 
drivers to switch into insurance, then there would be no effect on uninsured drivers. We 
expect that the former case is empirically relevant.  
Finally drivers in the (1,2) cells would be insured in the absence of compulsory 
insurance, but choose not to insure themselves when it is required. Assuming that individuals 
do not derive some benefit from defying compulsory insurance regulations, this cell will be 
empty.  
In summary, we have identified two critical groups: those who adopt insurance 
because of regulation (who are likely to drive more and less carefully) and those who are 
always uninsured (who are likely to drive less and more carefully because of regulation). 
 
Hypothesis H1: Under compulsory insurance: 
(i)  The proportion of uninsured motorists decreases. 
(ii)  The decrease in uninsured motorists produces an increase in fatalities among 
switchers. 
(iii)  Those who remain uninsured motorists drive more carefully, producing a 
decrease in fatalities for this group. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
effect on the insured driver through the price of insurance. These indirect effects presumably have only a small 
impact on driving behavior, since this is more likely to be affected by insurance status than the extent of coverage. 
5 Shavell (1982) notes that the presence of insurance creates equivalence between strict liability and a negligence 
rule form of liability. Though insurance does create moral hazard, Shavell demonstrates that the provision of 
insurance is socially desirable.  
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We test these hypotheses by examining the direct effect of compulsory insurance laws 
on fatalities and uninsured motorists. An issue that arises in identifying the effects of 
compulsory as distinct from no-fault regulations is that both sets of laws often were 
introduced together. In particular, states that adopted no-fault limitations on liability adopted 
compulsory insurance regulations at the same time, and likewise for add-on regulations. As a 
result, to identify the effect of compulsory insurance, we restrict attention to states and years 
that have neither no-fault nor add-on provisions. We refer to this as the compulsory sample. 
Table 3, column (1), presents the states and years that are included in this sample. All 50 
states and regions are represented in the sample. In the Midwestern, Southern, and Western 
states, approximately half are present for the entire sample period. The least represented 
region is the Northeast, with New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont represented for the 
full sample period, but many other Northeastern states represented only in the early 1970s. 
 
3.2 The Effect of No-Fault Systems 
The literature on no-fault systems has argued that motorists will drive less carefully under 
no-fault than a tort system. Since a no-fault system limits drivers’ liability from their actions, 
it weakens their incentives to take precautions when driving. By the same token, it also could 
lead to increased driving. 
  However, this argument ignores the fact that the effects of no-fault limitations on 
liability will be different for insured and uninsured drivers. The standard analysis applies to 
the former group. Insured drivers are protected (by insurance) from liability if they are the 
victims of an accident, and no-fault limits their liability if they cause an accident. In contrast, 
for uninsured drivers the incentives differ in these two cases. If an uninsured driver causes an 
accident, then he faces reduced liability under a no-fault scheme; this presumably leads to 
reduced precautions when driving. If an uninsured driver is the victim of an accident, his 
recourse to compensation is also limited in a no-fault system; this would lead to more 




Hypothesis H2:  By adopting no-fault limitations on liability in addition to compulsory 
insurance requirements: 
(i)  For uninsured drivers, coverage decreases, possibly leading to a decrease in 
fatalities. 
(ii)  For insured drivers, liability decreases, leading to an increase in fatalities. 
 
The overall effect is thus theoretically ambiguous, and an empirical investigation is needed. 
As discussed above, one difficulty with identifying the effect of no-fault laws as 
distinct from compulsory laws is that most states adopted these laws at the same time. To 
identify the effect of no-fault limitations on liability, as distinct from compulsory insurance, 
we examine the effect of no-fault among states that have either compulsory insurance or no-
fault regulation, excluding add-on states (we call this the no-fault sample). As we can see 
from column (2) of Table 3, this is a somewhat more restrictive sample. All regions are 
represented, but for a reduced period. Many states are present later in the sample period after 
they had adopted compulsory, no-fault and compulsory, or had eliminated no-fault or add-on 
provisions. 
  We cannot (and do not) claim that this sample, and likewise the compulsory sample 
discussed in Section 3.1, corresponds to the full sample of U.S. states. However, both 
samples are broadly representative. Further, we will allow for year fixed effects to address 
the issue that the no-fault sample is more representative of the latter half of the sample 
period. Finally, the samples represent the only sub-groups in which the effects of these 
policies can be identified, so to that extent we have to accept this limitation. 
 
3.3 The Effect of Insurance Status on Fatalities 
To the extent that insurers cannot monitor the behavior of the policyholder perfectly and 
make the policy conditional on optimal behavior, insurance coverage will tend to reduce the 
care and precautions that drivers take while driving. This is the familiar moral hazard cost of 
insurance. Thus, the prediction is that the higher the proportion of uninsured motorists, the 
lower the number of accidents.  
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Hypothesis H3: A higher incidence of uninsured motorists leads to fewer traffic fatalities.  
 
In the popular press and in the literature on uninsured motorists, the existence of such 
motorists is viewed as unambiguously bad. We do not question that the presence of 
automobile insurance produces risk-bearing and compensation benefits. Our interest, 
however, is in exploring whether insurance also has a down side, a moral hazard cost, which 
needs to be taken into account in any assessment of uninsured motorists and regulations 
affecting their incidence.  
We use an instrumental variable strategy to identify the effect of uninsured motorists 
on traffic fatalities; because both of these outcomes are jointly determined, OLS estimation 
of the relationship would be subject to simultaneity bias.
6 As established in Imbens and 
Angrist (1992) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1994), an instrumental variables strategy 
identifies the effect of the instrument on those who are induced to change their “treatment 
assignment” based on the instrument. In our case, the instrumental variables strategy thus 
identifies the effect on those induced to join insurance as a result of compulsory insurance 
regulation. As discussed in Section 3.1, we expect the effect for this group to be negative: as 
the proportion of uninsured motorists decreases, fatalities increase because of the moral 
hazard effect on switchers. 
The two candidates for instrumental variables are compulsory insurance and no-fault 
liability laws. In Section 5.1 we argue that both sets of laws are exogenous conditional on a 
range of controls, hence plausible candidates for instruments. But we must also consider 
whether either of these variables satisfies the requirement that they affect the outcome 
(fatalities) only through their effect on uninsured motorists. 
As discussed in Section 3.2, no-fault laws affect fatalities by influencing the liability 
that drivers face from their actions. Even if the number of uninsured motorists were 
unaffected by no-fault laws, the laws could have a significant effect on fatalities through 
incentive effects on both motorists who are currently insured and those who are uninsured. 
                                                 
6 In particular, traffic fatalities depend on the number of insured drivers, but we can imagine a second equation in 
which drivers choose insurance status based on the rate of traffic fatalities. In this case, the OLS estimates of a 
single equation will be inconsistent.  
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Instead, the direct effect of the adoption of compulsory insurance on fatalities is to 
induce motorists to switch from being uninsured to insured. There is also potentially an 
indirect effect, namely inducing drivers who remain uninsured to drive more carefully. 
Despite the possibility of an indirect effect, we believe that an instrumental variable is a 
reasonable strategy for two reasons. First to the extent that the indirect effect depends on the 
number of uninsured motorists induced to drive more safely, the effect should be small. 
Second, and more importantly, to the extent that the indirect effect of compulsory insurance 
on fatalities will lead to a reduction in traffic fatalities (if uninsured motorists are induced to 




4      Data Description 
We use a panel of annual state-level variables. The data cover all 50 U.S. states and the 
District of Columbia for the years 1970-1998.
8  The data include information about (1) some 
components of automobile insurance law; (2) the level of uninsured motorists; (3) states’ 
demographics characteristics; and (4) fatality rates. 
We obtain information about automobile insurance regulations and accident liability 
regulations from the American Insurance Association (AIA) for the years 1970 to 2001. The 
variables we use are: (1) whether a state has compulsory auto insurance – “yes” denotes 
those states requiring minimum liability insurance or showing some proof of financial 
responsibility; (2) which enforcement mechanisms a state uses for compulsory insurance 
(including checking insurance status at the time of an accident, or verifying insurance status 
at the time of vehicle registration); (3) whether a state adopted a no-fault or add-on system 
instead of a tort liability system (the default), and (4) whether a no-fault state has a monetary 
or verbal threshold (and the value of the threshold). 
We obtain data on uninsured motorists from the Insurance Research Council (IRC) 
for the years 1976-1998. Several methods have been used to estimate the proportion of 
uninsured motorists; see Khazoom (1997). From these, we use the IRC’s estimates, because 
                                                 
7 Thus, if the direct effect of uninsured on fatalities is negative, an indirect effect would bias our results toward zero.  
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they are the most comprehensive of those available.
9 The incidence rates of uninsured 
motorists reported by the IRC vary considerably across states, from 4% in Maine to 30% in 
Colorado and South Carolina (for the year 1997). 
A description of our variables appears in Table 1, and their sources are outlined in the 
Data Appendix. 
 
5      The Results 
5.1 The Conditional Exogeneity of the Laws 
In studying the effect of compulsory insurance and no-fault regulation on the proportion of 
uninsured motorists and driving fatalities, it is important to investigate first whether the laws 
are plausibly exogenous (conditional on the covariates and time and year fixed effects in our 
specification).  The concern is a systematic selection of which states choose to adopt these 
laws and when.  There are three potential sources of selection.  
First is selection on observables: states that choose to adopt may differ in terms of 
age, population, ethnicity, and income. We will address this by including these variables as 
controls in our subsequent specifications. Second, we are concerned with selection on the 
outcome, in particular that states with a higher level of uninsured motorists or fatalities may 
be more likely to enact automobile insurance legislation. This will be addressed by allowing 
for state and year fixed effects. Third, there could be time-varying selection on the outcome. 
In particular, states that experience a shock (for example a sudden increase) in one of the 
outcomes may be more likely to adopt regulation. Since controlling for lagged dependent 
variables in a fixed-effects regression is challenging, this is a greater concern.  
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Information on uninsured motorist is available only from 1976 on. 
9 The IRC uses two variables to calculate the proportion of uninsured motorists: Uninsured Motorists Claim, which 
is the number of uninsured motorists claims for injuries caused to the insured by uninsured motorists and Bodily 
Injury Liability Claim (BI), which is the number of injuries caused by insured motorists. The ratio of Uninsured 
Motorists Claim frequency to Bodily Injury Liability Claim frequency is then used to measure the extent of the 
uninsured motorist problem. Under the null hypothesis of no moral hazard and equal probability of an accident for 
insured and uninsured motorists, it can be shown (using the model of Levitt and Porter (2001)) that the IRC measure 
is identical to the fraction of uninsured motorists in the population. Thus, this issue does undermine our conclusion 
that the possibility of no moral hazard can be rejected. Furthermore, as an empirical matter, we check the robustness 
of our results to using the log (rather than the level) of uninsured, since this variable is more robust to potential 
measurement error.  
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Table 4 examines selection issues empirically. In columns (1) and (4) we present a 
probit regression of compulsory insurance and no-fault regulation on a range of exogenous 
variables, including population, ethnic composition, crime, per capita income, and the age 
profile of the population. Most are statistically significant predictors of the laws. States with 
a lower proportion of blacks, more violent crimes, and a higher proportion of drivers outside 
the 18-to-24 age range are more likely to have compulsory insurance. For no-fault, the signs 
are largely reversed. This basic set of variables predicts the laws with about 70 percent 
accuracy. Thus, in our subsequent specifications, controlling for these observables will 
account for a significant proportion of selection into the laws. Of course, we will also include 
an additional, powerful source of control, namely state and year fixed effects. 
In columns (2) and (3) we examine the predictive power of lagged differences in the 
proportion of uninsured motorists and fatalities for compulsory insurance, and in columns (5) 
and (6) we examine the impact of these variables on no-fault. Neither the first nor the second 
set of lagged differences is a significant predictor of compulsory insurance or no-fault 
regulation. Furthermore, the increase in the predictive power of the models is minimal, 
increasing from 68 to 72 percent for compulsory and 77 to 78 percent for no-fault regulation. 
This suggests that shocks to outcomes are not a significant source of selection in our data. 
Of course it is impossible to rule out the possibility of forward-looking selection on 
outcomes. But the evidence we examine suggests that our exogenous controls and state and 
year fixed effects address the most important issues of selection.  
 
5.2 The Effect of Compulsory Insurance  
We begin by examining the impact of compulsory insurance laws on the proportion of 
uninsured motorists and traffic fatalities. In addition to being of intrinsic interest, this will 
serve as the first stage of our instrumental variables strategy, presented in the next section. 
As indicated above, compulsory insurance was introduced by some states concurrently with 
no-fault. In order to obtain an estimate of the effect of compulsory insurance, unconfounded 
with the effects of no-fault, we restrict ourselves to the sample of states and years that were 
not under a no-fault or add-on regime.  
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Table 5 presents our specifications. In addition to introducing a dummy for 
compulsory insurance, we control for a range of variables including automobile registration 
per capita, proportion of trucks among registered vehicles, the fraction black of the 
population, violent and property crimes, unemployment, and per capita real income. In 
column (1) we see that the direct effect compulsory is negative and statistically significant at 
the one percent level. This confirms hypothesis H1(i). The magnitude is large as well. 
Compared to a base level of 12.9 percent, compulsory insurance reduces uninsured motorists 
by 2.4 percentage points.  
The result in column (1) is important for two reasons. First, it establishes that 
compulsory insurance achieved at least part of its mandate of reducing uninsured motorists. 
Second, the size and significance of the effect will be helpful when using compulsory 
insurance as an instrument for uninsured motorists. 
In columns (2) and (3), we examine the robustness of this result. In column (2) we see 
the effect of compulsory insurance within a four-year window of the passage of compulsory 
insurance laws. Though this more than halves the number of observations, using a narrower 
window reduces the effect that state-specific time trends might have on the estimates. We 
note that the effect remains similar in sign, magnitude, and significance. In column (3),  we 
reestimate column (1) using log uninsured as the dependent variable.  We find that 
compulsory insurance remains negative and significant at the 1 percent level and that the 
magnitude of the effect is very similar: the coefficient of –0.024 in column (1) corresponds 
roughly to a 20 percent effect on uninsured, as does the effect in column (3). 
In column (4) we examine the impact of two mechanisms used to enforce compulsory 
insurance, namely checking insurance status at the time of an accident and requiring that 
insurance is verified when the vehicle is registered. The former does not have a statistically 
significant effect, but the latter is significant and negative, further reducing uninsured 
motorists by 1.7 percentage points. 
In columns (5) to (7) we see that the effect of compulsory insurance on fatalities per 
person is somewhat equivocal. In column (5), the direct effect is negative, though not 
statistically significant. When we estimate the effect within a four-year window of the 
adoption of compulsory insurance, shown in column (6), we find a positive (and  
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insignificant) effect. In column (7), we see that when we include enforcement mechanisms 
for compulsory insurance (checking insurance status at the time of an accident, verifying 
insurance status at the time of registration) the direct effect is positive and significant, but the 
enforcement mechanisms have a negative (and significant) effect on fatalities. 
The fact that the effect on fatalities is not overwhelming is not surprising in light of 
the discussion in Section 3.1 (hypothesis H1, ii and iii). Whereas individuals who switch 
from being uninsured to insured might drive less carefully, thereby increasing fatalities, we 
would expect the opposite effect for those individuals who remain uninsured.  
 
5.3 The Effect of Uninsured Motorists 
Table 6, column (1), presents an OLS regression of the effect of the ratio of uninsured 
motorists on fatalities per person. The coefficient is positive, but not statistically significant. 
However, as discussed above, this estimate potentially suffers from simultaneity bias. In 
subsequent columns, we address this issue by using an instrumental variables strategy.  
Column (2) presents the estimated effect of uninsured on fatalities using compulsory 
insurance as an instrumental variable.  We see that effect is negative and significant at the 5 
percent level. This confirms hypothesis H3. The magnitude of the effect is such that a 0.01 
increase in the ratio of uninsured motorists leads to a 2 percent decrease in fatalities per year 
(26 fatalities relative to a per state and year average on the order of 1000). A one standard 
deviation variation in uninsured would lead to a 10 percent decrease in fatalities.
10 
In columns (3) and (4) we examine the sensitivity of our results. When we estimate 
the effect in a four-year window of the passage of compulsory insurance regulations, we still 
obtain a negative estimate. The fact that the coefficient is no longer significant is not 
surprising given that we lose two thirds of our observations, and of course still allow for state 
and year fixed effects. In column (4) we examine the impact on log uninsured. The effect has 
                                                 
10 The reason why we estimate the effect of uninsured on fatalities for the compulsory sample is that our 
instrumental variables strategy is valid only for this sample. For compulsory insurance we have a clear case that any 
direct effect of compulsory on fatalities will bias our results toward zero. Instead, in the full sample we have to 
contend with the direct and indirect effects of no-fault regulation (since these cannot be distinguished from the effect 
of compulsory insurance, in the full sample). In particular, though the effect of no-fault regulation through uninsured 
may lead to a decrease in fatalities, the direct effect of no-fault leads to an increase in fatalities, as we show in 
Section 5.4.  
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the same sign, and remains statistically significant at a 1 percent level.  The magnitude of the 
effect is also similar. 
In columns (5) and (6) we examine the robustness of the result to additional controls. 
In column (5) we control for vehicle miles traveled per person. This controls for shifts in 
driving patterns that might account for changing fatalities. In principle, vehicle miles traveled 
should also be seen as an outcome, since it can be influenced by insurance regulation. The 
magnitude of the coefficient on uninsured motorists increases, and remains statistically 
significant. In column (6) we control for an additional range of variables (automobile 
registration per person, average speed, alcohol consumption per capita, and the proportion of 
new cars), and again the effect of interest remains statistically significant.
11  
Hence the negative relationship between the proportion of uninsured motorists and 
traffic fatalities confirms the moral hazard effect discussed in Section 3.1. Because 
instrumental variables identify the effect experienced by those induced to switch as a result 
of compulsory insurance, the instrumental variables estimate identifies the effects on 
switchers, and confirms the moral hazard story.
12 
  It is important to stress that the purchase of insurance by motorists has effects other 
than on fatalities, and these effects are clearly beneficial. Such insurance reduces the risk-
bearing costs of drivers and leads to compensation of some victims who otherwise would 
receive less or no compensation. So, although interesting and important for its own sake, the 
moral hazard costs of insurance are just one element in an overall evaluation of the incidence 
of uninsured motorists.  
 
                                                 
11 We use fatalities per person, rather than fatalities per vehicle mile traveled (which is more common in the 
literature), as the outcome because vehicle miles traveled is potentially affected by changes in regulation, rendering 
the latter more difficult to interpret. Our results are similar when using fatalities per vehicle mile traveled. 
12 As noted in Imbens and Angrist (1992), even though the IV estimator identifies the effect of the endogenous 
variable on the outcome for those induced to switch by the instrument, we cannot specifically identify these 
individuals in our data. To the extent that we think of uninsured drivers as being inherently riskier (in terms of risk 
attitude -- driving behavior, driving older vehicles, etc.) our result of increased fatalities among switchers makes 
sense.  
18
5.4 The Effect of No-Fault Regulation 
As discussed in the introduction, the literature has established that no-fault laws increased 
traffic fatalities in conjunction with compulsory insurance. The literature has been confined 
to examining this joint effect because it has examined no-fault regulation in isolation from 
compulsory insurance. In this section, we identify the effect of no-fault, as distinct from 
compulsory insurance, by confining ourselves to the states and years that had either 
compulsory insurance or no-fault. Hence, the effect of no-fault is relative to the starting point 
of compulsory insurance.
13 
  In Table 7, columns (1) to (5), we examine the effect on uninsured motorists. In 
column (1), we see that no-fault increases uninsured motorists: the effect is both large (3.1 
percentage points) and significant (at the one percent level). In column (2) we reestimate the 
same specification in a four-year window of the passage of no-fault legislation. The effect is 
somewhat larger in magnitude, and still statistically significant. In column (3), we run the log 
specification and obtain similar results: the effect is significant at a 1 percent level and 
corresponds to a magnitude of roughly 3 percent.
14 
In column (4) we examine the effect of the thresholds above which accident victims 
can resort to tort claims.  A no-fault system with a low threshold essentially should operate 
like a tort system, since most claims exceed the threshold beyond which tort action is 
permitted (a result which is established theoretically in Liao and White (1999)). A threshold 
of zero corresponds to an add-on system where victims have a choice of whether to resort to 
no-fault or tort. The lowest threshold among pure no-fault states is $200. As the threshold 
increases, the no-fault system becomes more stringent. We incorporate this information into 
the categorical variable “level” which takes the value zero for add-on states, one for no-fault 
                                                 
13 Note, however, that the form of compulsory insurance under tort and no-fault systems differs. Under tort, 
compulsory insurance consists of third-party coverage. Under no-fault, compulsory insurance consists of first-party 
coverage. We examine the sensitivity of our results to this difference as follows: we compare the effect of 
compulsory insurance under a tort system with the effect of a no-fault system with a low threshold. The latter system 
imposes only a negligible degree of tort limitation, and thus we estimate the effect of the move from third- to first-
party compulsory insurance.  The effect is very small in magnitude, and not statistically significant. This suggests 
that our results are robust to this concern. 
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states with low thresholds (less than $200), and two for states with high thresholds (greater 
than $500).  If the effect of no-fault on uninsured motorists is robustly positive, then we 
expect this coefficient also to be positive: as the no-fault system becomes more stringent, 
uninsured motorists increase. Our results confirm this: the effect of the level variable is 
positive and significant.
15 Of course, because the variable is categorical, the magnitude of the 
effect is difficult to interpret.
16 Likewise in column (5) we note that the effect of level on log 
uninsured is positive and significant at a 1 percent level. 
  In columns (6) to (8) we examine the effect of no-fault on fatalities. In column (6) we 
see that the direct effect is positive and significant. Thus, from hypothesis H2, the effect of 
reduced liability dominates the effect of reduced insurance. The magnitude of the effect is on 
the order of 6 percent. This corresponds to 2,400 to 3,200 lives in the United States 
depending on the year.
17 In column (7) we reestimate the effect in a four-year window of the 
passage of no-fault legislation. Since the sample size is greatly reduced, it is not surprising 
that the effect is no longer statistically significant. However, the sign of the effect remains 
positive, although the magnitude is smaller. In column (8) we observe that the threshold 
effect for fatalities is also positive and statistically significant. Overall, these results provide 
strong evidence of the incentive effects of no-fault regulation. In Section 3.3, we observed 
that, though drivers who are uninsured might in principle drive more carefully under no-
fault, insured drivers experience a reduction in their exposure to liability and would 
accordingly drive less carefully. Given the relative proportions of these two groups, it is 
natural that the latter effect dominates for fatalities.
18 
  While the effect of no-fault on traffic fatalities is important, we wish to stress again 
that it is not the sole consideration in assessing such a system. Such a system has benefits in 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 If we were to examine the effect of no-fault on uninsured in the full state-year sample the effect would be positive, 
but smaller in magnitude and not significant. This is because in the full sample the effects of no-fault and 
compulsory insurance are confounded (by the fact that they were typically introduced at the same time). 
15 Rolph, Hammitt, and Houchens (1985) using a micro-level cross-section of insurance claims in 1977, show that 
that a positive threshold leads to a reduction in bodily injury insurance claims. Our result differs because it allows 
for state and year fixed effects, covers a much longer time horizon, and examines the impact of the threshold on 
fatalities. 
16 An additional check would be to exclude low-threshold states from the no-fault group. Our results are robust to 
this specification. 
17 This is on the lower end of the range of estimates produced by Cummins, Phillips, and Weiss (2000).  
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terms of reducing administrative costs, and these benefits might make it worthwhile even if it 
increases traffic fatalities. Whether this would be the case, of course, would depend on the 
magnitude of the effect, if any, on traffic fatalities. 
 
6      Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the effect of compulsory insurance regulation and no-fault 
limitations on the incidence of uninsured motorists and on traffic fatalities. Also, using 
compulsory insurance laws as an instrumental variable, we have investigated the effect of 
insurance on traffic fatalities.  
The evidence indicates that compulsory insurance rules do deliver their intended 
effect, which is a significant reduction in the incidence of uninsured motorists. The evidence 
also indicates that increasing the incidence of insurance produces an increase in fatalities. 
The magnitude of this moral hazard effect is potentially large: a two percent increase in 
fatalities for each percentage point decrease in uninsured motorists. While the switch by 
some motorists to become insured increases fatalities, this is at least partly offset by the 
effect of compulsory insurance on those drivers who chose to remain uninsured. These 
individuals drive more carefully, which works to reduce fatalities. Finally, we have been able 
to isolate the effect of the reductions in liability brought about by moves to a no-fault system. 
Such reductions in liability produce a significant increase in fatalities. Our analysis indicates 
that drivers’ behavior, like the behavior of economic agents in other contexts, is influenced 
by financial incentives. Reductions in the expected financial costs of accidents, produced by 
reductions in liability or by the purchase of liability insurance, lead to more traffic 
fatalities.
19 
It is interesting to note that the presence of uninsured motorists is generally regarded 
as a severe problem (see Insurance research Council (1999, 2000), National Association of 
Independent Insurers (1999), and Kahzoom (2000)). Assuming that it is undesirable to have 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 In the full sample, the effect of no-fault on fatalities is smaller, though still statistically significant. 
19 Our results in this paper contrast with those of Cohen and Einav (2001). The latter study finds that mandatory seat 
belt laws are not associated with the moral hazard cost of increased fatalities. Whether this contrast in findings is 
due to differences in the type of payoff affected, or other institutional features of the laws, is an open question.  
21
uninsured motorists, researchers examining this subject have focused on ways to reduce the 
incidence of such motorists. We do not doubt that a reduction in the incidence of uninsured 
motorists will produce some benefits by increasing the extent to which accident victims are 
compensated. Indeed work by Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans (1989) documents an increase 
in loss payments and a reduction in legal and administrative expenses under no-fault regimes. 
However, our analysis indicates that such reductions are not an unmitigated good. 
Automobile insurance also has a costly side, reducing precautions and increasing fatalities.
20 
Indeed, our work indicates that reducing the incidence of uninsured motorists might not 
make potential victims better off. To be sure, when some uninsured motorists switch to 
purchasing insurance, victims of accidents caused by these motorists might receive more 
compensation. However, potential victims also would face a higher incidence of such 
accidents. And, as long as victims cannot generally expect to be fully compensated for such 
accidents (which they cannot, as insurance levels are often insufficient to cover damages 
fully), increasing the number of accidents would be costly to potential victims. Whether or 
not potential victims would benefit from reducing the incidence of uninsured motorists thus 
would depend on which of these two effects is stronger, an issue which the present analysis 
cannot resolve. 
Our analysis also indicates that, whatever the benefits of moving to no-fault liability, 
such benefits involve a significant moral hazard cost. In particular, the evidence suggests that 
such moves increase fatalities, and that this increase is larger than has been previously 
recognized.  
Of course, our evidence does not enable us to reach an overall assessment of the rules 
governing accident liability and accident insurance. By focusing on traffic fatalities alone, we 
ignore, among other things, the effect of such rules on risk-bearing costs or on administrative 
costs. However, our analysis does highlight some of the unintended consequences of the 
rules governing automobile insurance and liability. By identifying and estimating the moral 
hazard costs of automobile insurance and no-fault arrangements, our analysis highlights 
important effects that should be taken into account in an overall assessment of these policies.  
                                                 
20 In a full cost-benefit analysis, the value of the additional loss of life would have to be assessed. For details, see the 
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Data Appendix 
Variable  Description / Source 
Traffic fatalities  Total of people being killed in a car accident. Years available: 1970-
1975. Source: Highway Statistics; 1975-1998. Source: the FARS. 
Income per 
capita 
Income per capita. Years available: 1976-1998. Source: 1976-1984, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1983-1998, U.S. Census. 
New cars  Number of new cars registered. Years available: 1975-1998. Source: 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. 
New cars per 
registered 
[New cars]/[registered] 
Population  Total population. Years available: 1970-1998. Source: Bureau of 
Justice Statistics. 
% Black  Percentage Black of population. Extrapolated between non-census 
years. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
% Hispanic  Percentage Hispanic of population. Extrapolated between non-census 
years. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
% Population 
age 5-17 
The percentage of people in the population at the age 5 to 17. Years 
available 1970-1998. Source: the U.S. Census. 
% Population 
age 18-24 
The percentage of people in the population at the age 18 to 24. Years 
available 1970-1998. Source: the U.S. Census. 
% Population 
age 25-44 
The percentage of people in the population at the age 25 to 44. Years 
available 1970-1998. Source: the U.S. Census. 
% Population 
age 45-64 
The percentage of people in the population at the age 45 to 64. Years 
available 1970-1998. Source: the U.S. Census. 
Property crimes  Number of property crimes. Years available: 1970-1998. Source: 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Property crimes 
per capita 
Total property crime per capita. Years available: 1970-1998. Source: 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Car registered  Number of cars registered. Years available: 1976-1998. Source: 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. 
Trucks registered  Number of trucks registered. Years available: 1975-1998. Source: 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. 
Trucks, % of 
total registered 
[Truck]/([Truck]+[Car Registered] 
Average speed  Years available: 1975-1995 Source: Highway Statistics. 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment rate. Years available: 1970-1998. Source: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  
Uninsured 
motorists 
Number of claims when an insured motorist is injured by a motorist 
who does not have liability insurance or by hit and run motorist. Years 
available: 1976-1997 (missing 1987 and 1988). Source: the Insurance 
Research Council 
Violent crime  Number of violent crimes. Years available: 1970-1998. Source: 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Violent crime 
per capita 
Total violent crime per capita. Years available: 1970-1998. Source: 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Vehicle miles 
traveled, total 
Vehicle miles traveled for roads. Years available: 1970-1998. Source: 
Highway Statistics.   28
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 










































































































































































































































































       
Minimum  obs. 889 265 623 554 334 
Maximum  obs.  1327  364 912 874 402 
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Table 2: Automobile Liability Insurance Law 
State  Compulsory Insurance  No-fault Insurance  Add-on Provision 
Alabama No     
Alaska  1986- (except for year 1989)     
Arizona  1983- (except for years 1990-1995)     
Arkansas 1988-    1974- 
California  1975-  (except for years 1990-1995)    
Colorado 1974-  1974-   
Connecticut 1973-  1973-   
Delaware 1972-    1972- 
District of Colombia  1984-  1984-1986  1987- 
Florida 1972-1977  1972-   
Georgia 1975-  1975-1991   
Hawaii  1974-  1974-  (except for year 1998)   
Idaho 1976-     
Illinois 1989-     
Indiana 1983-     
Iowa 1998-     
Kansas 1974-  1974-   
Kentucky 1975-  1975-   
Louisiana 1979-     
Maine 1988-     
Maryland 1973-    1973- 
Massachusetts Before  1969-  1971-   
Michigan 1973-  1973-   
Minnesota 1975-    1975-   
Mississippi No     
Missouri 1987-     
Montana 1981-       
Nebraska 1986-       
Nevada 1974-  1974-1979   
New Hampshire  No    1971- 
New Jersey  1973 -   1973-   
New Mexico  1984 -     
New York  Before 1969  1974-   
North Carolina  Before 1969     
North Dakota  1976 -  1976-   
Ohio 1984  -     
Oklahoma 1977-     
Oregon 1980-    1972- 
Pennsylvania  1975-  1976-1983; 1990 -  1984-1989 
Rhode Island  1992-     
South Carolina  1974-    1974- (except for year 1990) 
South Dakota  1987-    1972- 
Tennessee      
Texas 1984-    1973- 
Utah  1974- (except for years 1990-1994)  1974 -   
Vermont  1986; 1988-1989; 1992-     
Virginia 1984-    1972- 
Washington 1991-    1978- 
West Virginia  1986-     
Wisconsin     1972- 
Wyoming 1980-     
 
Number of states  46 state  17 states  13 states   30
Table 3: Samples used for Compulsory and No-Fault 
State  Region  Compulsory evaluation sample  No-fault evaluation sample 
Iowa Midwest  1970-2000  1998-2000 
Illinois Midwest  1970-2000  1989-2000 
Indiana Midwest  1970-2000  1983-2000 
Kansas Midwest  1970-1973  1974-2000 
Michigan Midwest  1970-1972  1973-2000 
Minnesota Midwest 1970-1974  1975-2000 
Missouri Midwest  1970-2000  1987-2000 
North Dakota  Midwest  1970-1975  1976-2000 
Nebraska Midwest  1970-2000  1986-2000 
Ohio Midwest  1970-2000  1984-2000 
South Dakota  Midwest  1970-1971 
Wisconsin Midwest 1970-1971 
Connecticut Northeast 1970-1972,  1999-2000  1973-2000 
District of Columbia  Northeast  1970-1983  1984-1986 
Massachusetts Northeast  1970-1971  1970-2000 
Maine Northeast  1970-2000  1988-2000 
New Hampshire  Northeast  1970 
New Jersey  Northeast  1970-1972  1973-2000 
New York  Northeast  1970-1973  1970-2000 
Pennsylvania Northeast  1970-1975  1975-1983,  1990-200 
Rhode Island  Northeast  1970-2000  1992-2000 
Vermont  Northeast  1970-2000  1986, 1988-1989, 1992-2000 
Alabama South  1970-2000 
Arkansas South  1970-1973 
Delaware South  1970-1971 
Florida South  1970-1971  1972-1977 
Georgia South 1970-1974,  1992-2000  1975-2000 
Kentucky South  1970-1974  1975-2000 
Louisiana South  1970-2000  1979-2000 
Maryland South  1970-1972 
Mississippi South  1970-2000 
North Carolina  South  1970-2000  1970-2000 
Oklahoma South  1970-2000  1977-2000 
South Carolina  South  1970-1973  1974-1989, 1995-2000 
Tennessee South  1970-2000 
Texas South  1970-1972 
Virginia South 1970-1971 
West Virginia  South  1970-2000  1986-2000 
Alaska West 1970-2000  1985-2000 
Arizona West  1970-2000  1983-1989,  1996-2000 
California West  1970-2000  1975-1989,  1996-2000 
Colorado West  1970-1973  1974-2000 
Hawaii West 1970-1973  1974-2000 
Idaho West  1970-2000  1976-2000 
Montana West  1970-2000  1981-2000 
New Mexico  West  1970-2000  1984-2000 
Nevada West 1970-1973,  1980-2000  1974-2000 
Oregon West 1970-1971 
Utah West  1970-1973 
Washington West  1970-1977 
Wyoming West  1970-2000  1980-2000   31
 
Table 4: Are the Laws Predictable? 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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% population between 













            
Lagged first difference 









            
Lagged fist difference 









            
Twice Lagged first 
difference of ratio 
uninsured    
0.16 
(-0.34)    
-0.57 
(-0.46) 
            
Twice lagged first 
difference of fatalities    
0.42 
(-2.03)    
-0.25 
(-2.17) 
            
Observations 1221  910  808  1221  910  808 
            
Predictive accuracy  0.68  0.70  0.72  0.77  0.78  0.78 
            
Observations 1221  910  808  1221  910  808 
  Standard  errors  in  parentheses         
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